Identifying and establishing consensus on the most important safety features of GP computer systems: e-Delphi study by Avery, Anthony et al.
Refereed papers
Identifying and establishing consensus on
the most important safety features of
GP computer systems: e-Delphi study
Anthony J Avery BMedSci DM FRCGP
Professor of Primary Care
Boki S P Savelyich BSc MRes
Research Associate
Division of Primary Care, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
Aziz Sheikh MB BS MD FRCGP
Professor of Primary Care Research and Development, Division of Community Health Sciences:
GP Section, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
Judy Cantrill MSc FRPharmS
Professor of Medicines
Caroline J Morris PhD MRPharmS
Research Fellow
School of Pharmacy and Pharmaceutical Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
Bernard Fernando MB BS MSc
General Practitioner, Thames Avenue Surgery, Rainham, Kent, UK
Mike Bainbridge BMedSci BM BS MRCGP
Technical Director
Pete Horsﬁeld BMedSci BM BS
Clinical Director
Sheila Teasdale MMedSci
Service Director
Primary Care Information Services (PRIMIS), Division of Primary Care, University of Nottingham,
Nottingham, UK
ABSTRACT
Our objective was to identify and establish consensus
on the most important safety features of GP com-
puter systems, with a particular emphasis on medi-
cinesmanagement.Weused a two-round electronic
Delphi survey, completed by a 21-member multi-
disciplinary expert panel, all from theUK. Themain
outcome measure was percentage agreement of the
panel members on the importance of the presence
of a number of diﬀerent safety features (presented
as clinical statements) onGP computer systems.We
found 90% or greater agreement on the importance
of 32 (58%) statements. These statements, indicating
issues considered to be of considerable importance
(rated as important or very important), related to:
computerised alerts; the need to avoid spurious
alerts; making it diﬃcult to override critical alerts;
having audit trails of such overrides; support for
safe repeat prescribing; eﬀective computer–user
interface; importance of call and recall manage-
ment; and the need to be able to run safety reports.
The high level of agreement among the expert panel
members indicates clear themes and priorities that
need to be addressed in any further improvement
of safety features in primary care computing sys-
tems.
Keywords: Delphi survey, general practice, infor-
matics, patient safety
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Introduction
There is an increasing body of evidence that errors in
primary care result in harm to patients, particularly in
relation tomedicines management.1 Most prescribing
in the United Kingdom (UK) is undertaken by general
practitioners (GPs), and it is here that attention needs
to be focused in order to reduce the disease burden
associatedwith errors inmedicinesmanagement. Com-
puter systems, which are now routinely used in UK
primary care, have considerable potential for prevent-
ing medication errors and improving patient quality
of care.2–6 In addition, the UKGovernment has recently
launched several strategic initiatives to ensure further
integration and harmonisation of computerisation
throughout all areas of health care.1,7
The critical issue in using technology to maximise
prescribing safety is that computer systems should be
set up so that prescribers are alerted if they try to take
an action that is likely to be hazardous. However, this
is not made explicit in the Requirements for Accred-
itation – the National Health Service (NHS) Infor-
mation Authority regulated core requirements – to
which all GP systems should be capable of performing.8
Indeed,we are aware that some systems are deﬁcient in
terms of the alerts that they issue.9,10 Therefore, iden-
tifying particular situations where patient safetymight
be compromised, and developing a conceptual frame-
work within which to analyse these situations, is likely
to prove beneﬁcial.
Our aim in this study was to identify and reach
consensus on the key clinical scenarios involving
patient safety for which GPs might beneﬁt from
information technology (IT) support, particularly in
relation to medicines management. The study was a
part of a larger project funded by the National Patient
Safety Agency to explore the potential of computer
systems for improving patient safety in primary care.
Methods
In order to reach consensus on the most important
issues among experts, we used an electronic Delphi
technique. The Delphi approach has been widely used
in healthcare research as an approach to establishing
consensus.11,12 One recent example is its use in the
development of health service indicators.13 Figure 1
shows the steps involved in the two-round Delphi
procedure used in this study.
Initially we compiled a database of 30 experts drawn
from those in academic, clinical, administrative and
business settings, whose work has been directly relevant
to the application of computers in medicine. From
this group we purposefully selected an expert panel of
22members. Our selection criteria aimed to ensure an
adequate breadth of expertise and perspectives on
general practice computing and patient safety as well
as availability of the selected people within the time-
frame of the study.
Through searching the literature and drawing on
clinical experience, two members of the research team
(AA and BS) identiﬁed an initial list of medicines
management errors/safety considerations where a
possible role for IT-based solutions has been con-
sidered. These issues were then formalised into clinical
statements and shared among the full study team for
comments and reﬁnement. Based on this feedback,
we selected statements agreed by the entire multi-
disciplinary team as being potentially important and
incorporated these into a questionnaire for circulation
to the Delphi panel members.
The questionnaire was circulated by email to the
Delphi panel members in two rounds. Respondents
were asked to score the importance of each statement
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from very important
to irrelevant. The scores from the ﬁrst round were
circulated to the Delphi panel along with the ques-
tionnaire for the second round. The panellists were
asked to score the questions in the second Delphi
round having considered all the scores, and any com-
ments, from the ﬁrst round. Consensus was deﬁned as
having been achieved if 90% or more of the panel
members rated that statement as ‘important’ or ‘very
important’ after the second round.
Based on advice from the local research ethics
committee, we did not need ethical approval for this
study. The two-round Delphi process was conducted
during the ﬁrst quarter of 2003.
Results
All 22 panel members invited to take part in the study
agreed to participate. One panel member, however,
failed to reply to the ﬁrst Delphi round questionnaire
and was therefore excluded from the second round.
All 21 members who completed the ﬁrst round went
on to complete the second round. The professional
backgrounds and key characteristics of the Delphi
panel are given in Table 1.
We formulated 55 clinical statements, and these
were incorporated into our questionnaires. State-
ments considered important by 90% or more of
respondents after round 2 are given in Table 2;
statements that were considered important by less
than 90% of respondents are shown in Table 3.
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We found 90%or greater agreement for 32 statements,
with an average agreement on the importance of these
questions of 98%. For 42 statements, the agreement
was 80% or more and for only ﬁve items were levels of
agreement below 70%.
The key themes around which consensus was
achieved were:
. the importance of computerised alerts
. the need to minimise spurious alerts
. making it diﬃcult to override critically important
alerts
. having audit trails of such overrides
. support for safe repeat prescribing
. eﬀective computer–user interface
. importance of call and recall
. the need to be able to run safety reports.
In terms of the computer–user interface the following
were considered important:
. making it diﬃcult to override hazard alerts
. providing a clear display of alerts
. highlighting drugs with similar names
. having mechanisms to ensure that prescribers
recorded the reasons why any particularly serious
hazard alerts were overridden.
Repeat prescribing issues were also considered im-
portant:
. drug overuse
. drug underuse
. items being requested beyond the agreed review
date
. whether or not the item had been authorised as a
repeat prescription.
Other safety issues considered important included:
. the coding of clinical conditions (especially use of
Read codes)
. monitoring of clinical results or appointments
. laboratory links
. alerts for extreme or clinically relevant results.
Second round
questionnaire
distributed
START
Problem defined
Panel members were selected
based on the expertise required
Questionnaire containing
statements prepared
First round
questionnaire
distributed
Analyse questionnaire
Feedback and tabulated
responses for second round
Reportings of
findings
Final analysis
Figure 1 Flow diagram showing two round e-Delphi process
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Discussion
Our multidisciplinary Delphi panel reached agree-
ment on the importance of a range of safety features
relating to GP computer systems. The results are likely
to provide relevant information for policy makers and
developers of GP computer systems, given that we
used a well-established technique for consensus build-
ing, worked through a multidisciplinary expert panel,
and achieved a high response rate from participants.
GP computer systems used in the UK already have
many of the safety features identiﬁed in our modiﬁed
Delphi study. For example, current Requirements for
Accreditation of computer systems ensure that inter-
action alerts, allergy alerts and certain aspects of repeat
prescribing are covered.8However, in a previous study
we have showndeﬁciencies inGP computer systems in
terms of contraindication alerts, the presence of spu-
rious alerts, managing repeat prescribing and warning
about similar drug names.10 These are safety issues
that were considered important by our Delphi panel.
In theUKwehave fed our results back to theNational
Patient Safety Agency and the National Programme
for Information Technology in the NHS.14 It is hoped
that our ﬁndingswill help to inform the safety require-
ments for GP computer systems in coming years. Our
Table 1 Demographic and professional characteristics of Delphi expert panel
Panellist no. Gender Professional background Professional role
1 M GP Academic/Clinical
2 M GP Clinical
3 F Pharmacist Academic
4 F GP Academic/Clinical
5 M Pharmacist GP computer system specialist
6 M GP Health policy
7 F Pharmacist Academic
8 F Pharmacist Clinical/Academic
9 M GP Clinical
10 F GP Policy/Clinical
11 M GP Policy
12 M GP GP computer system specialist/Clinical
13 M GP Clinical
14 M GP Academic/GP computer system specialist
15 M GP Clinical/Technical
16 F Pharmacist Academic/Clinical
17* M GP GP computer system specialist/Clinical
18 F Primary Care Manager GP computer system specialist/Manager
19 M GP Academic/Clinical
20 M GP Policy/Clinical
21 M GP Academic/Clinical
22 F Pharmacist Clinical
*Did not reply to the ﬁrst round and was therefore excluded from the second Delphi round
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Table 2 Statements considered important by 90% or more of respondents (n=21)
Section 1: Prescribing safety issues
Scoring: 5 = very important; 4 = important; 3 = of equivocal importance; 2 = unimportant; 1 = irrelevant
No. Statement: ‘When selecting a drug the computer should alert the
prescriber if . . .’
Median
score
% agreement
for scores
4 & 5
1 . . . the drug may be contraindicated because of the patient’s age, e.g. use
of aspirin in children
5 95%
3 . . . the drug is contraindicated because of pregnancy, e.g. cytotoxics such
as methotrexate
5 95%
6 . . . the drug is contraindicated because of a previous allergy, e.g.
penicillin
5 100%
7 . . . the drug is contraindicated because of a recorded diagnosis of renal
impairment, e.g. oxytetracycline
5 100%
8 . . . the drug should be used with caution because of a recorded diagnosis
of renal impairment, e.g. ACE inhibitors
4 95%
9 . . . the drug is contraindicated because of a diagnosis of DVT, e.g.
combined with contraceptive pill
5 95%
11 . . . the drug is contraindicated because of elevated serum creatinine
(>150Mol/L), e.g. oxytetracycline
4 100%
15 . . . the drug is contraindicated because of a recorded diagnosis of heart
failure, e.g. non-selective beta-blockers such as propranolol
5 95%
16 . . . the drug is contraindicated because of a recorded diagnosis of
coronary heart disease, e.g. triptans such as sumatriptan
5 95%
17 . . . the drug is contraindicated (or should be used with caution) because
of a recorded history of peptic ulcer, e.g. non-selective NSAIDs
5 100%
18 . . . the drug is contraindicated because of a recorded diagnosis of
asthma, e.g. non-cardio-selective beta-blockers such as propranolol
5 100%
21 . . . there is a clinically signiﬁcant potential interaction with another drug
that the patient has recently been prescribed, e.g. sildenaﬁl and nitrates
5 100%
26 . . . the frequency of dose may be inappropriate and dangerous, e.g.
methotrexate prescribed daily
5 100%
27 . . . the necessary monitoring requirements have not been met, e.g. full
blood count not recorded within the previous 12 weeks in a patient
taking methotrexate
4 90%
Section 2: Repeat prescribing safety issues
35 When a patient requests a repeat prescription the computer should make
it clear whether the item requested has been authorised as a repeat
5 100%
36 When practice staﬀ try to print out a repeat prescription it should be
clear whether the item requested has gone beyond its review date
5 100%
38 When practice staﬀ try to print out a repeat prescription they should be
alerted if patients appear to be either under-using or over-using their
medicines
4 90%
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Table 2 continued
Section 3: General safety issues
Decision support
39 When selecting a drug, the computer system should be capable of
providing the clinician with information on the safety of this drug
5 90%
40 Hazard alerts need to provide clinicians with suﬃcient detail to enable
them to make informed decisions
5 95%
41 Hazard alerts need to be designed so that they do not provide clinicians
with irrelevant or spurious information
5 100%
Interface
42 Hazard alert messages should be displayed clearly on the computer
screen
5 100%
43 It should be diﬃcult to override alerts if there is a risk of serious patient
harm as a consequence, e.g. prescription of sildenaﬁl with a nitrate
5 100%
44 If a clinician decides to override a clinically relevant hazard alert they
should be prompted to record a reason for this
5 100%
45 When selecting a drug from a drop-down menu there should be
mechanisms in place to make it diﬃcult erroneously to issue a drug with
a similar name if this could cause serious patient harm, e.g. penicillin
and penicillamine
5 100%
Coding
47 When suppliers of clinical databases construct hazard alerts they should
use only those codes that are associated with a genuine hazard (e.g. using
codes for the interaction between verapamil [rather than all calcium
channel blockers] and beta-blockers)
5 95%
Monitoring
48 It should be possible to set up the system so that patients can be
automatically recalled for blood tests and other forms of monitoring
4 100%
Lab links
50 Users should be alerted to seriously abnormal results, e.g. hyperkalaemia 5 100%
Reporting and clinical audit
51 It should be possible to record intended referrals on the computer and
then run reports to identify any patients who have not subsequently been
referred
5 90%
52 It should be possible to run reports on patients who have received
potentially hazardous drug–drug combinations
5 100%
53 It should be possible to run reports on patients at risk from their
medication, e.g. patients on long-term high-dose oral corticosteroids
who are not receiving prophylaxis for osteoporosis
5 100%
54 Computer systems should be designed so that it is possible to produce an
audit trail of clinicians’ actions in response to hazard alerts
5 100%
55 It should be possible to run reports to identify situations where a
clinician has overridden a clinically important hazard alert
5 100%
The most important safety features of GP computer systems: e-Delphi study 9
Table 3 Statements considered important by less than 90% of respondents
Section 1: Prescribing safety issues
Scoring: 5 = very important; 4 = important; 3 = of equivocal importance; 2 = unimportant; 1 = irrelevant
No. Statement: ‘When selecting a drug the computer should alert the
prescriber if . . .’
Median
score
% agreement
for scores
4 & 5
2 . . . the drug is not indicated because of the patient’s gender, e.g.
erroneous prescription of female hormones to men
4 70%
4 . . . the drug is contraindicated in pregnancy and the patient is a woman
of childbearing age, e.g. cytotoxics such as methotrexate
4 75%
5 . . . the drug is contraindicated because a woman might be breastfeeding,
e.g. cytotoxics such as methotrexate
4 75%
10 . . . it is an unlicensed indication, e.g. statin in heart failure 3 45%
12 . . . the drug should be used with caution because of elevated serum
creatinine (>150Mol/L), e.g. ACE inhibitors
4 85%
13 . . . the drug should be used with caution because of a recorded diagnosis
of liver failure, e.g. opioid analgesics
4 80%
14 . . . the drug should be used with caution because of elevated serum
transaminases, e.g. statins
4 85%
19 . . . the drug should be used with caution because of a recorded diagnosis
of diabetes, e.g. systemic corticosteroids
4 85%
20 . . . the drug is contraindicated because of a recorded diagnosis of
thyroid dysfunction, e.g. when considering starting a patient on
amiodarone
4 75%
22 . . . there is a potential contraindication that might be implied from
another drug that has been prescribed, e.g. attempted use of a non-
cardio-selective beta-blocker in a patient taking bronchodilators (proxy
for asthma/COPD)
5 65%
23 . . . variations in bioavailability mean that diﬀerent formulations of a
drug may not have the same clinical eﬀects, e.g. attempted generic
prescription of a lithium preparation
4 70%
24 . . . the quantity of medication supplied might be dangerous in overdose,
e.g. greater than one month’s supply of an older tricyclic antidepressant
at full dose (150mg per day)
3 10%
25 . . . the length of treatment course supplied might be dangerous without
review, e.g. greater than three months’ supply of methotrexate
4 65%
AJ Avery, BSP Savelyich, A Sheikh et al10
ﬁndings may also be relevant to other countries
that are considering the safety features that need to
be available on computer systems used in primary
care.
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